Or, how to fly more than 10 hours in a U2 with nine hours' fuel.
Most readers probably know that between 1956 and 1960, the US conducted U2 overflights of the Soviet Union. Most also probably know that those overflights “ended” when Gary Powers’ ill-fated flight was shot down near Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960.
Yes, the “ended” above is in quotations for a reason. While Powers’ flight was the last acknowledged intentional US overflight of Soviet territory by a U2, it was not the last such overflight. At least one other overflight occurred – and it occurred at perhaps the worst possible time in human history.
. . .
The week of Monday, 22 October 1962, should need no introduction to either regular TAH readers or those with a knowledge of Cold War history. That week was the public part of the Cuban Missile Crisis – e.g., the week the US and USSR very nearly played a “game” called Global Thermonuclear War.
But at the same time that Maj. Anderson’s aircraft was downed, another U2 mission was underway. And it wasn’t over Cuba. Rather, it was 5,000+ miles to the northwest.
. . .
Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, U2s were operating elsewhere in the world. The USSR had resumed atmospheric nuclear testing in 1961, at Novaya Zemlaya. So in October 1962 the US was regularly sending sampling missions over the Arctic to obtain fallout samples from those tests in an operation called “Project Star Dust II”.
The route of the mission scheduled for 27 October 1962 was simple. It was to take off from Eielson AFB, AK; fly north to the North Pole, obtaining fallout samples (if there were any); and return. The flight was a routine one, scheduled well in advance.
The execution wasn’t exactly as planned.
. . .
The pilot of the sampling flight in question was Capt. Charles Maultsby, USAF. He would have preferred to have been flying missions over Cuba, but his current assignment was flying missions over the Arctic.
Maultsby’s flight to the North Pole on 27 October 1962 went reasonably well. However, as he approached the North Pole he had to determine the correct south heading for his return (all directions from the North Pole are by definition south, but obviously most headings won’t result in a return to Eielson AFB).
Further: at high northern latitudes, a compass isn’t particularly useful. So on such missions the U2 pilot had to use celestial navigation – e.g., star sightings via sextant. And as Maultsby made his early-morning (Alaska time) approach to the North Pole, the aurora was particularly strong.
To make a long story short: Maultsby’s navigation was off. Instead of returning to Alaska, he flew west of Wrangel Island and ended up over far eastern Siberia’s Chukot Peninsula.
SAC HQ was monitoring Maultsby’s flight. For whatever reason, the Soviets were not using strong encryption on their Siberian Air Defense network. The US had discovered this – and unknown to the Soviets the US was monitoring that network in virtually real time. But this fact was, obviously, a critically important secret. Radioing Maultsby a message to the effect that, “Um, guy, you are currently over the Soviet Union; turn due east” would disclose that secret – and was simply not going to happen.
A second complicating factor was the fact that USAF procedures of the day mandated a change in ordnance on frontline US air defense interceptors when the US went to DEFCON 3. Specifically, the F-102’s based in Alaska at that point changed from conventional air-to-air missiles to ones having small nuclear warheads.
Earlier during the week, we’d gone to DEFCON 3 – then DEFCON 2. So our Alaska-based interceptor aircraft were now armed with air-to-air missiles having nuclear warheads.
The USSR wasn’t exactly thrilled at the fact that another US U-2 was flying over Soviet territory. They scrambled interceptors from two Siberian airfields on the Chukot Penisula – airfields near the towns of Pevek and Anadyr – in an unsuccessful attempt to intercept Maultsby’s U-2. In response, the US launched F-102s from the former Galena AFB in Alaska in the event Maultsby required air support during his return.
. . .
After penetrating some distance into eastern Siberia, Maultsby determined he was likely over the USSR. He was able to contact one of his mission’s support/search and rescue aircraft via radio; they advised Maultsby that it was sunrise over central Alaska and asked him if he could see the sunrise. Since he could not (Maultsby was several hundred miles west at the time), this information confirmed that he was indeed over the USSR and needed to head east. He did so.
One problem: by this time, Maultsby no longer had enough fuel to reach Alaska under his own power. He’d taken off with 9 hours 40 minutes of fuel; his flight, now a substantially longer one, would take in excess of 10 hours. However, the U2 glides well – up to 250 miles when starting at high altitude. So with about 12 minutes fuel remaining, Maultsby cut his engines and glided until he was met by two US F-102s from Galena AFB over extreme western Alaska. They suggested to him a landing at a USAF radar station near Kotzebue (about 150 miles NNE of Nome).
Maultsby successfully landed there. After being assisted from his cockpit by one of the radar site’s crew, to paraphrase the late Frank Zappa he then emulated the famous Huskies and immediately “made a bunch of yellow snow”. No word on whether he used the opportunity to write his initials – or his name – in said snow. (smile)
Maultsby’s U2 flight was the longest duration U2 flight on record at the time. He’d flown for 10 hours and 25 minutes – on 9 hours 40 minutes worth of fuel. He’d also inadvertently overflown several hundred miles of Soviet territory, including flying within intercept range of two Soviet air bases. Only the fact that he was at a much higher altitude than Soviet interceptors of the day could reach saved him. (The fact that the Soviets had indeed twice tried to intercept him during his inadvertent Soviet overflight wasn’t made known to Maultsby until well after he’d landed.)
Maultsby was not disciplined by the USAF for the mission gone awry. However, at least one other account of his flight (besides the ones linked below) exists and indicates he was never again allowed to fly polar sampling missions.
Maultsby later flew 200+ combat missions in Vietnam, retiring from the USAF as a Colonel in the late 1970s. He passed away on 14 August 1998 in Tucson, AZ.
. . .
An account of Maultsby’s 27 October 1962 mission can be found in Michael Dobbs’ excellent book about the Cuban Missile Crisis One Minute to Midnight in chapters 8, 9, and 11. These can be found online here, here, and here. (Later chapters also give post-flight details, including an account of Maultsby’s personal briefing to the CINCSAC – Gen. Thomas Power – afterwards.) The graphic accompanying this article is from that source.
A shorter account of Maultsby’s flight can also be found on the National Security Archive website here. Both of these accounts provide additional background and/or details not discussed above.
As of 2008, the official USAF investigation into Maultsby’s flight remained classified. To my knowledge, it remains classified today and has never been released to the public. The information Dobbs used to prepare the graphic in his book was found in State Department files in the National Archives during his research for the book. An image of the map of Maultsby’s flight Dobbs found in the National Archives can be seen here.
I guess the official history is correct, technically speaking. Presumably “100 per cent successful” in this context means that Maultsby’s flight returned with samples usable by Project Star Dust II. The fact that the flight also involved an unauthorized overflight of the USSR on the absolute worst day of the Cuban Missile Crisis and could easily have sparked World War III is merely an “irrelevant minor detail”. (smile)
FWIW: tomorrow will be the 56th anniversary of Maultsby’s Soviet overflight. Rest in peace, Colonel Maultsby.
https://thisainthell.us/blog/?p=82350
