More light reading: Anti-partisan operations

Guerrilla warfare is as old as time itself. During more recent times this type of operation has assumed an ever greater importance in military and political planning. That the study of partisan and antipartisan combat methods is an absolutely necessary element of any up-to-date military training program is obvious. …

Partisan operations do not conform to any hard and fast tactical doctrines or principles that have general applicability. The partisan fighter is unpredictable and unscrupulous. His weapons are usually simple in design and limited in number. They achieve deadly effectiveness in the hands of a tough, crafty group of individuals who operate almost entirely independent of normal logistical support. Proficient in camouflaging their activities, these men spread a reign of terror over the civilian population of their own country.

Success in antipartisan warfare is not a matter of observing certain rules or applying standing operating procedures that have proved effective in particular instances. Rather, it is contingent upon carefully gathering all facts for evaluating the partisans’ command structure, intelligence system, mobility in occupied territories, and relationship to the civilian population. The more examples from practical experience that are available for analyzing these factors, the better prepared will be those who might be called upon to lead the fight against partisans. The study of these examples will condition the future leaders and arouse their imagination, thus preparing them for missions that, under the present conditions of warfare, are likely to be assigned to any military commander.

… Far more important than the application of proper tactics, however, is the adoption of a sound overall policy guaranteeing the successful conduct of antipartisan operations. This policy must develop appropriate propagandistic, economic, and political measures designed to turn the civilian population of occupied areas against the partisans and to obtain cooperation in the antipartisan struggle. The enforcement of such a policy is the responsibility of the top-level command. It must be planted before the first bomb is released over enemy territory and must be applied when the first soldier sets foot on enemy soil.

During their first encounter with partisans, combat troops usually tend to underestimate the importance and effectiveness of these irregular forces, principally because their equipment consists solely of small arms. What a dangerous fallacy! In most instances partisans are energetic and relentless men driven by a fanatic belief in their cause. Weak individuals drop from the ranks long before seeing action. The partisans’ will to resist and their resolve to inflict damage, regardless of international convention, compensate for deficiencies in equipment. – DA Pamphlet No. 20-269, Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia, July 1953.

(DA Pam 20-269 was based on articles and studies written by officers of the army recently defeated by an enemy “whose chief characteristics … were … savagery, fanaticism, and toughness of the individual soldier …” The average German combat soldier was no less savage, no less fanatic or tough in fighting the Red Army, nor was his top-level leadership any less reluctant to expend any number of soldiers necessary to attain victory for a fanatic cause.)